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ABSTRACT 
The Middle East is a region of vital interest, not just to the United States, but also to the 
entire world.  It is also an area of severe water scarcity.  Due to a variety of factors, the 
demand for water in the Middle East is rapidly increasing, placing additional stress on 
already constrained water supplies.  Because water has no substitutes and is an important 
part of economies, culture, security, and life itself, it is not surprising that many warn of 
impending wars over water.  However, conflict over scarce water resources is not the 
only possible outcome.  Cooperation between states to share the benefits of this 
increasingly precious commodity is not only another possibility; it is the more likely 
outcome.  Wars fought over water are very unlikely to end successfully for any 
participant, with the costs far outweighing any benefits, while cooperation maximizes the 
benefits from a limited resource.  While interstate war over water is unlikely, water could 
still cause issues internal to Middle Eastern countries.  Without proper management 
practices and forward-looking policies, lack of water could lead to internal conflicts, 
which could cause significant unrest in the region. 
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I. THESIS INTRODUCTION  
This thesis seeks to answer the question of whether scarce water resources in the 
Middle East may lead to interstate friction or, alternately, cooperation.  The Middle East 
region is one of the most water-starved areas on Earth.  Expanding populations promise 
to strain the already severely limited resources, potentially to the point that violent 
competition over possession of water will occur.  Central to this question is an 
examination of current thinking on resource scarcity, as well as the relations among those 
states that share waterways and the degree to which these states have successfully 
addressed any differences over access to this critical resource.  This thesis examines the 
relationships of states that share major sources of water in the Middle East, to determine 
whether their shared water sources may lead to conflict in an attempt to exploit the water 
to fill their own needs or, alternatively, cooperation to divide the shared benefits the 
resource can offer. 
Additionally, this thesis considers the current viability of water utilization 
practices of regional states.  Attempts to make the desert bloom with nonindigenous, 
relatively water intensive vegetation, and expansion of populations further into areas 
devoid of natural water resources, are examples of current practices in the Middle East 
that already are straining available resources. A rapidly rising population and expanding 
middle class only promise to further increase tensions and stress resources.  This 
examination establishes the foundation for understanding the degree of stressed water 
resource levels, and begins to lay the groundwork to recommend practices that would 
make better use of the scarce water in the region. 
A. IMPORTANCE 
The Middle East is a region of great economic, strategic, cultural, and religious 
importance to the entire world.  It is uniquely important as the seat of three major 
religions and the cradle of civilization.  Geographically, the Middle East is located at the 
crossroads between Europe and Asia, where trade and investment are of vital importance.  
The vast oil and gas reserves contained in the region form the backbone of modern 
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economies.  As the home of rogue states, state sponsors of terrorism, and numerous 
terrorist groups, the region has the potential to harm international interests regionally as 
well as at home.  The significance of this is that conflicts over resources could have 
serious consequences not just in the region itself, but for the entire world. 
Current conflicts over resources, and the potential of future conflicts in response 
to increasingly scarce supply of these resources, have been an area of intense study.1  
While competition for nonrenewable resources such as diamonds, oil, and copper has 
caused extreme and violent conflicts between various groups and nations, and promises 
to do the same into the future, the treatment of water as a commodity has differed.  While 
violent conflicts involving water certainly have occurred, there also has been a history of 
shared utilization of water resources to the benefit of all those involved.  An examination 
of conflict and cooperation over water in the Middle East will shed some light on whether 
water is actually different from other resources. 
While the Middle East is a region that is particularly starved of water resources 
and tends to share the vast majority of water across national boundaries, from the 
standpoint of potential conflict over water, it is not unique.  There are more than 260 
international rivers, traversing almost half the nations in the world, and this number 
continues to rise as more countries are created.2  In the next 30 years, 50 countries, home 
to more than 3.3 billion people, could face serious water shortages.3  In this sense, the 
Middle East serves as a testing ground for what the rest of the world may expect when 
water shortages inevitably occur.  If scarce water resources in the region lead to conflict, 
the entire globe may inevitably be consumed with disputes over water.  If, however, 
water scarcity leads to Middle-Eastern cooperation, models for future joint efforts will be 
created. 
                                                 
1 Attention to this idea has been widespread in scholarly publications, mainstream movies, the news, 
blogs, and every other form of communication. 
2  Aaron T. Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways,” Water Policy 1, no. 2 
(1998): 251. 
3  Don Hinrichsen and Henrylito Tacio, “The Coming Freshwater Crisis is Already Here,” Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars: Environmental Change and Security Program, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/popwawa2.pdf (accessed Feb 07, 2011), 2. 
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B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Current resource scarcity theory makes dire predictions about growing 
populations and increased incomes causing an ever-rising demand for resources that have 
a finite supply.  Since water is essential for agriculture, industry, and basic human 
survival, it is understandable that nations would view access to and possession of water 
as part of their vital national interests and, therefore, worth fighting for.  However, water 
has the potential to have a character different from other resources.  While fighting over 
diamonds, oil, and the like, has clear historical examples, water has been treated 
differently, with examples of past cooperation seeming to be just as prevalent as 
conflicts. 
Examination of the potential for conflict or cooperation over water resources 
necessarily implies assessment of examples of both of these possibilities.  In order to 
analyze interstate illustrations on the prospect of either conflict or cooperation, this thesis 
looks at the relations between states that share major waterways in the Middle East.  This 
thesis also examines current water management strategies and their potential viability in 
order to examine the possibility for domestic conflicts or cooperation. 
This paper finds that, on the whole, competition over water resources is more 
likely to lead to cooperation for the shared benefit of those involved rather than violent 
conflict.  Research reveals that there are numerous and varied examples of nations 
working together in order to ensure their access and use of water.  While disputes over 
water are somewhat common, they seldom lead to violent conflict.  Where violence has 
broken out, it is likely that water concerns are not the primary cause.  Instead, it may be a 
secondary cause or just the excuse needed to act on existing tensions.  Additionally, this 
thesis reveals that current water management strategies in the Middle East are on the 
whole inefficient and not viable into the foreseeable future.  This misuse of water, if it 
continues, will further stress water supplies. Although this in itself would not necessarily 
be the primary cause of future conflicts, it could be the spark that is needed to ignite 
existing tensions between nations or within societies. 
 
 4
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into five chapters consisting of a general 
explanation, case study analyses, and results and conclusions.  Chapter II lays the 
analytical framework.  It explores the current state of water resource supply and use, 
starting with a world view and narrowing to the Middle East. Next, international norms 
and agreements on how water is, and is supposed to be, shared, are examined.  From 
there, resource scarcity theory, especially in regard to how it applies to water, is analyzed.  
The views of both optimists and pessimists are investigated and explained with the 
Middle East region as the backdrop for this analysis.  Chapter II concludes that although 
water resources are currently under stress, and will become more scarce in the future, 
cooperation is more likely than conflict over these limited resources. 
The following three chapters are case studies utilizing the theories and data 
developed in Chapter II to further examine the main questions asked in this thesis.  
Chapter III is a case study of the conflict and cooperation between the states that share 
water within the Jordan River basin.  As an area in which several nations share the same 
primary source of water, and where much of the world’s attention has been focused for 
more than the past 50 years, much literature and scholarship is devoted to the ideas of 
conflict and cooperation in this basin.  Specifically, the cases of the 1967 war, the 
Palestinian Intifada, and more modern peace agreements are examined to show that water 
has largely not been a source of conflict and, instead, has fostered cooperation.   For 
reasons similar to those in Chapter III, the Chapter IV is a case study of the riparians 
along the Tigris/Euphrates river basins.  The main cases investigated in this chapter are 
the wars that never happened, despite the intense friction between Turkey, Syria, and 
Iraq.   
Chapter V also is a case study, covering the internal water management strategies 
specific to the Gulf Region of the Middle East.  Primarily composed of oil rich states 
with authoritarian governments, this case examines the management practices of the 
wealthiest states that are able to implement strategies they see fit without requiring the 
wider consent of their populations.  Additionally, the Gulf countries form a suitable area 
in which to study domestic water management strategies because they have among them 
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the highest environmental adaptive capacity in the world, while facing a critical risk 
factor for freshwater scarcity.4  These states will be able to provide the maximum range 
of possibilities in the arena of water management.   This chapter concludes that, while 
many of the management strategies in the region have been unnecessary and inefficient—
at times even detrimental—water can be managed effectively even in the most arid 
conditions.  Current water practices in the area are unsustainable, however, and could 
lead to unrest and instability. 
The sixth and final chapter consists of the conclusion and recommendations. This 
chapter succinctly and specifically details the findings of the thesis.  It summarizes the 
various case studies in light of the analytic framework established in the second chapter 
demonstrating that scarce water resources can, and do, often lead to cooperation to the 
mutual gain of all parties involved.  Additionally, it takes the lessons learned from the 
various cases to make recommendations to further encourage collaboration to ensure the 












                                                 
4 James A. Russell, “Environmental Security and Regional Stability in the Persian Gulf,” Middle East 
Policy XVI, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 90–101, 91 and 96. 
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II. WATER BACKGROUND: USE, SHARING, AND POTENTIAL 
CONFLICT 
The wars of the next century will be fought over water. 
—Ismail Serageldin5 
There is little doubt that the Middle East is short of water, but sadly, suffers from 
no shortage of conflict.  The region is, as a whole, one of the most water-starved areas on 
the planet and is well known for its long history of violent conflict both within and 
among states.  Additionally, as an area of great importance due its geographical location, 
oil reserves, and other factors, it is not surprising that much has been written about water 
and conflict in the region.  This chapter reviews the relevant literature in order to set the 
framework for the analysis that follows.  The general patterns of water’s availability and 
uses are first established to provide context for the region.  From there the two dominant, 
but competing, views of water’s role toward fomenting violent conflict and as a pathway 
for peace are examined.  These competing views can be characterized as water pessimists 
and water optimists, and the analysis of these views makes up the bulk of the chapter. 
A. WATER AVAILABILITY AND USE 
The vast majority of the earth’s surface is covered by water.  However, this does 
not necessarily mean that plentiful water is available for our use.  More than 97 percent 
of the world’s water is contained in the oceans.  Of the approximately 2.5 percent that 
remains, a large portion is frozen in ice caps and glaciers.  More water is contained within 
other sources that are inaccessible or impractical.  What remains for human use, as 
drinkable water from renewable sources such as runoff from rivers and lakes and the 
amount stored by dams, is only about one-hundredth of one percent of all the earth’s 
water.6  Additionally, this water is by no means evenly distributed around the world. 
                                                 
5  Ismail Serageldin, Water, http://www.serageldin.com/Water.htm (accessed Feb 26, 2011). 
6  Barbara Rose Johnston and John M. Donahue, “Introduction,” in Water, Culture, & Power: Local 
Struggles in a Global Context, ed. John M. Donahue and Barbara Rose Johnston, 1–8 (Washington, DC: 
Island Press, 1998), 1. 
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The amount of available freshwater varies greatly from state to state, and is 
sometimes difficult to measure.  While specific water resources, like rainfall and river 
flow, can be easily measured and accounted for, sources such as soil water and so-called 
“virtual water” are almost impossible to track effectively, and make overall water 
accounting problematic.7  However, it is estimated that 60 percent of the world’s 
available freshwater supplies are located in just nine countries scattered around the 
globe.8  Additionally, while the Middle East and North Africa contain only 1 percent of 
global freshwater supplies, they account for more than 5 percent of the world’s 
population.9  This is why, even though some experts say the supply of fresh water is more 
than adequate to meet the needs of the world’s current population; some regions suffer 
from serious water deficiencies.10 
The relative deprivation of certain nations or areas is often expressed by noting a 
country’s water “stress” or “scarcity.”  Water scarcity is a general concept and is the 
point where water demands by all sectors cannot be fully met due to the total demand of 
users impinging on the supply or quality of available water.11  For specific points of 
reference, these terms are measured by analyzing the annual water supplies available per 
capita expressed in meters cubed (m3).  A nation is said to be experiencing water stress 
when this number is below 1,700 m3, water scarcity when the number is less than 1,000 
m3 and absolute scarcity when the number is below 500 m3.12  As a whole, the Middle 
East and North Africa have a renewable average annual water supply per capita is 
                                                 
7  Tony Allan, The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy (New York, 
NY: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000), 33. 
8  “For Want of a Drink,” The Economist: A Special Report on Water, May 22, 2010: 1. 
9  Nils Peter Gleditsch, Kathryn Furlong, Havard Hegre, Bethany Lacina and Taylor Owen, “Conflicts 
over Shared Rivers: Resource Scarcity or Fuzzy Boundaries,” Political Geography 25, no. 4 (May 2006): 
363. 
10  Sandra L. Postel, “Entering an Era of Water Scarcity: The Challenges Ahead,” Ecological 
Applications 10, no. 4 (Aug 2000): 941. 
11 “Water Scarcity,” United Nations: Water For Life, 2005–2015, 
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.html (accessed Feb 7, 2011). 
12  “Water Scarcity,” United Nations. 
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1,100 m3.13  This number does not tell the full story, however.  Even within the region, 
there are incredibly wide variations in water supply.  While Iraq has access to 3,077 m3 
per person per year of renewable water resources, Kuwait has just 8 m3.14  Overall, the 
Middle East is the most concentrated area of water scarcity in the world.15   
While water scarcity is clearly a function of the available water supply, other 
factors must also be taken into account.  Scarcity can also be a product of changing 
population sizes, water management policies and projects, climate change, cultural 
traditions, historical uses, economic output, state relationships, power politics, and many 
other factors.  While some of these factors can only be explained in more general terms, 
several, such as population growth, usage statistics, and management policies can shed 
light on the growing water scarcity problem with data.  Over the course of the last 30 
years, the population in the Middle East and North Africa has more than doubled.16  This 
does not mean, however, that the demand for water has merely doubled as a result.  In 
fact, in the last century, as the world’s population tripled, water use has grown at more 
than twice that rate.17  Rising populations, combined with rising incomes and the 
associated demand for increasingly exotic, and more water-intensive products, explains 
why water demands increase at a greater rate than population.  While only 2–3 liters of 
water a day are required per person for drinking water, the demands for other needs are 
much higher.  Worldwide, about 20 percent of water is used for domestic and industrial 
needs, 10 percent for power generation, and 67 percent for agriculture.18  In the Middle 
East, the agricultural demand is even more dramatic, with approximately 80 percent of all 
                                                 
13  The World Bank, “Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Management 
Results in the Middle East and North Africa,” The International Bank for Reconstruction and Devlopment, 
2007, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/10/10/000310607_200710101411
36/Rendered/PDF/411130was390400Englishoptmzd.pdf (accessed 7 2011, Feb), 139. 
14 Ibid., 142. 
15  Sandra Postel, Last Oasis: Facing Water Security (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1997), 29. 
16 World Bank, “Making the Most of Scarcity,” 151. 
17  UN Water, “Coping with Water Scarcity: Challenge of the Twenty-First Century,” 2007 World 
Water Day, Mar 22, 2007, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/docs/escarcity.pdf (accessed Feb 7, 2011), 10. 
18 “For Want of a Drink,” The Economist, 2. 
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water being used to support agriculture.19  Increased urbanization and dietary changes 
place increased demand on the agricultural sector, and will increasingly stress those 
areas, like the Middle East, that use a large portion of their water to grow food.  
Additionally, water management practices can further exacerbate the problem.  Great 
inefficiencies in the use and allocation of water in the region are created through heavy 
subsidies on water for agricultural purposes, even in water scarce areas, for products that 
are relatively water intensive.20 
B. HOW WATER IS SHARED 
The background given above shows how water is used and that, although water is 
abundant in the world, in certain areas such as the Middle East, accessible and usable 
water can be very scarce.  In addition to the hydrologic and economic issues already 
discussed, there are also important political factors that deal with the amount and 
condition of available water.  Chief among these issues is that political boundaries often 
have little to do with the naturally occurring water supply sources and that the taking of 
water on one side of a border can significantly affect those on the other side.21  For these 
reasons, the international system has developed principles, treaties, laws, and cooperation 
with regard to shared water resources.  While approximately 295 agreements have been 
negotiated and signed over a wide range of water issues throughout the world’s 263 
international river basins since 1948, this thesis only examines the overarching principles 
and most major agreements in order to provide a top-level analysis of how water 
resources are, and are intended to be, shared.22 
                                                 
19  Jeremy Berkoff, “A Strategy for Managing Water in the Middle East and North Africa,” The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Devlopment, The World Bank (Washington, DC, 1994), 12. 
20  Aaron T. Wolf, “Middle East Water Conflicts and Directions for Conflict Resolution,” 2020 Vision 
Briefs (International Food Policy Research Institute), no. 31 (1996), 11. 
21  Ewan W. Anderson, “Water: The Next Strategic Resource,” in The Politics of Scarcity: Water in 
the Middle East, ed. Joyce R. Starr and Daniel C. Stoll, 1–22 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 2. 
22  Meredith A. Giordan and Aaron T. Wolf, “The World’s International Freshwater Agreements,” 
Program in Water Conflict Management and Transformation, 
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/atlas/atlas_html/interagree.html (accessed Feb 07, 
2011). 
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Because water flows without respect to cartographic boundaries, and the actions 
of one riparian can affect another, the problems of sharing international waterways often 
boil down to the issue of territorial sovereignty.  General principles for deciding 
sovereignty over water resources are recognized and are widely employed by the 
international community to settle or prevent international conflicts over shared water 
resources.  In principle, each state has complete sovereignty over a basin located within 
its territory; each state along a shared resource has equal rights to its use as its neighbors 
upstream and down; all states are allowed to share in exploiting the basin’s water; and a 
state’s sovereignty is restricted to just and equitable use of the river’s water.23  While the 
first principle recognizes a nation’s sovereignty above all else, the others all involve some 
sort of limit on a state’s actions.  Clearly, while the first principle does not lend itself to 
agreements, and the others restrict sovereignty to some degree, agreements on water 
within the general international framework require that countries give up some of their 
freedom of action in order to be successful.  However, other principles that do not 
necessarily deal with sovereignty can also be used, including the mutual use, linkage, and 
image principles.24  Mutual use is the idea that a nation may require compensation in 
order to forgo some of its use of a shared resource.  The linkage principle is that countries 
may request other benefits to share water.  The idea of image is that one state may 
cooperate with another in order to make its neighbor look more positively at them.  These 
principles are more likely to be used when nations seek to gain from limiting their own 
actions. 
Beyond generally accepted international principles that normally govern states’ 
behavior, there have been several attempts made to refine the principles of international 
water sharing.  Among the most prominent of these measures are the Helsinki Rules of 
1966 on the Uses of the Water of International Rivers, and the United Nations’ 
                                                 
23  Arnon Soffer, Rivers of Fire: The Conflict over Water in the Middle East, trans. Murray Rosovsky 
and Nina Copaken (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 9–11. 
24 Ibid., 11. 
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Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.25  
The Helsinki rules focused on equitable utilization of shared water resources, listed 
relevant factors to be considered for this equity, and outlined means to resolve disputes.26  
In a more formal manner, the United Nation’s Convention confirmed the idea of 
equitable utilization, created its own means of conflict resolution, obliged riparians not to 
cause each other harm, established joint management mechanisms, and other measures.27  
In addition to these large-scale ideas, regional organizations have also taken it upon 
themselves to further encourage cooperation through the creation of region-specific 
guidelines.28  At a more micro level, basin-wide treaties have been established that create 
shared interests among the riparians and can be used for making further treaties that meet 
their specific needs.29 
While international principles, rules, treaties, organizations, and agreements may 
have some success at preventing or controlling water disputes, they do not solve the 
problem of shared water resources.  The simple fact remains that nations do not usually 
willingly give up their sovereignty, or limit their own actions, without something to 
gain.30  Simply put, “international law does not have the power to solve international 
river conflicts.”31  The Helsinki rules merely provide guidelines adopted by the 
International Law Association, which have no means of enforcement.  The UN’s 
                                                 
25 Giordan and Wolf. “World’s International Freshwater Agreements.” 
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/atlas/atlas_html/interagree.html (accessed Feb 07, 
2011). 
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Convention on International Watercourses took 27 years to adopt, and has still not been 
ratified by the overwhelming majority of UN members.  Regional groups and more 
specific basin treaties also regularly run into problems of enforcement, vague language, 
and varied interpretations.  While the possibility of cooperation over water certainly 
exists, so too does the opportunity for conflict.  It is to these two possibilities that this 
paper now turns.  
C. WATER PESSIMISTS 
With the idea in mind that large-scale international agreements may not be able to 
control water disputes, water pessimists generally argue that tension over shared water 
resources is likely to lead to conflict.  Pessimists tend to follow the ideas classically laid 
down in the tone of the dismal science, namely that population growth will eventually 
outpace the availability of resources, with the result being misery and vice.32  In this case, 
vice is conflict and misery is the reduction in population below that point at which water 
is too stressed.  Presently, pessimists believe that “conflict over critical water supplies is 
an ever-present danger.”33  Because water is an essential element of human life, 
competition for limited supplies can cause states to see water as a fundamental issue of 
national security.34  As limited supplies continue to be stressed, there will be increasing 
incidence of violent conflict with water scarcity as its root cause.35  Even where 
cooperation over water resources exists, for pessimists, these agreements are infrequent, 
fragile, and subject to the future instability of the relationships between partners.36 
While the pessimists’ concern about resource scarcity and environmental scarcity, 
often is applied broadly to different resources and various regions, the combination of 
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water scarcity and the Middle East provides a particularly potent blend of pessimistic 
worst-case scenarios.  Water, especially in the Middle East, can be viewed in part as both 
a renewable and nonrenewable resource.  Water, in its most commonly perceived and 
discussed form, is renewable, in that surface water, like flowing rivers, is recharged 
through the normal hydrologic cycle.  A substantial portion of the water used by several 
Middle Eastern nations, however, comes from nonrenewable groundwater, such as fossil 
aquifers.37  Unlike oil, or other resources for which wars have been fought, water has no 
substitutes, and no country, or person, can exist without it.  Of the three types of resource 
scarcity, supply-induced, demand-induced, and structural, Middle Eastern water has 
features of all of them.38  It is supply-induced because nations taking larger shares of 
river flows lower the quantity and quality of water available to others; demand induced 
because populations and changing tastes are raising demands for water; and structural 
because as one state takes more water, other states get less.  Additionally, where conflicts 
occur in regions that already have heightened tensions and a history of violence, such as 
the Middle East, the situation is less likely to be contained.39  Even though some scholars 
note that the environment is only one potential variable that can cause conflict, combined 
with other political, economic, and social causes, several regions in the Middle East 
already have situations that are near conflict.40  Clearly when scarcity-bred conflict is 
involved, water demand in the Middle East provides fertile ground for discord.  
Because water is important in culture, religion, nutrition, health, the proper 
functioning of the economy, and ensuring national security, the ramifications of securing 
water are reflected in each nation’s economic, legal, technological, security, and 
environmental policies.41  Four out of these five policy focuses, and the ones that are 
likely to be acted on by political leaders, increase the chances that the pursuit of water 
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will lead to conflict.  From the security perspective, water resources affect a nation’s 
security and even its very survival.42  Because water can be a source of economic or 
political strength, ensuring access to water provides a justification for war; denying the 
enemy’s access becomes a primary objective during conflict.43  From the economic 
viewpoint, water is essentially just like any other required good, and should be priced 
according to its value.44  While this outlook may appear relatively benign, when 
combined with the security imperative, economics may also lead to violent conflict.  Just 
as it has in the past, the security and prosperity of nations relies on its successful 
participation in the world’s economy.45  In fact, security and economic interests are 
deeply intertwined, and water is a vital resource to maintain and continue any sort of 
functioning economy.  Effectively pricing water could actually exacerbate the situation 
further, as increasing demands are placed on water-stressed nations leading a desperate 
state to attempt desperate measures.  The legal framework has already been discussed, 
but it is worth repeating that legal regimes to maximize the use of shared water resources 
require established rights to the water and flexibility in their use.46  Neither of these 
factors is present in the Middle East, and the legal perspective is unlikely to solve major 
issues.  The technological framework generally states that there is a sufficient quantity of 
water to satisfy global needs as long as appropriate technology is available.47  However, 
those who develop the appropriate technology may develop a large gap between the 
water “haves,” and “have nots,” which could present another type of potential water 
conflict. 
It is not just the classic interstate war to secure resources that could be a cause of 
violent conflict over dwindling water supplies.  In addition to the scarcity-induced war 
between states, Homer-Dixon identifies four other possible types of violent conflict 
                                                 
42 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, 19. 
43 Gleick, “Water and Conflict,” 84 
44 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, 23. 
45 Klare, Resource Wars, 7. 
46 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, 32. 
47 Ibid., 40. 
 16
arising from resource scarcity.48  These include disputes over environmental degradation, 
ethnic clashes from migration or social cleavages, civil strife, and conflicts between the 
developed and developing world.49  The majority of these potential conflicts are social in 
nature, which can sometimes have useful effects.  Especially in authoritative or repressive 
states, like many Middle Eastern countries, social change can be a reason to rally, 
distribute land and resources more efficiently, and incite institutional reforms.  However, 
scarcity itself, the reason for the conflicts, can also reduce the capacity of a nation to 
achieve any real changes, leading to a negative spiral.50  Additionally, some argue that 
even local instability can escalate to the international level of conflict, and possibly from 
there to international violence.51 
Resource pessimists paint a grim picture for the future in a world of increasing 
water scarcity.  As scarce water resources become more precious, violence and conflict 
become more likely.  Viewed through different lenses, equitable water distribution 
despite increasing scarcity may not continue to be assured through mechanisms outside of 
violence.  However, resource optimists look at the same data, trends, and systems and see 
a completely different result.  For optimists, increasingly rare water resources are likely 
to lead to cooperation for their shared use instead of conflict over their dominion. 
D. WATER OPTIMISTS 
While resource optimists acknowledge that supplies may become increasingly 
scarce as populations and demands grow, they generally feel that wars over water are rare 
and unlikely.52  Optimists argue that in potential conflicts over water, the cost of the fight 
would far exceed any benefits received and could destroy shared infrastructure essential 
to both sides, whereas the benefits of cooperation to all parties are clear.53  As a result, 
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interstate wars over scare resources are not likely.54  Even in those instances where water 
plays an important role in conflicts, water is more likely simply a tool of the conflict, 
target of aggression, or victim of the fighting.55   
Water pessimists do not necessarily state that violent conflict is inevitable, but 
they do tend to classify certain conditions as having a higher probability of leading to war 
than others.  Normally, the strongest case for an impending conflict is where a 
downstream riparian that is heavily dependent on the water from an upstream nation is 
much stronger militarily than its upstream neighbor.  However, optimists point to the idea 
that there is very little evidence that Israel, which fits this description well, has any link 
between hydrologic and military decision-making.56  In fact, far from heading toward 
conflict, Israel is perhaps the best example in the region of a state that has managed its 
water with some reasonable amount of efficiency.57  Water consumption has declined 
significantly, due in large part to the intentional slowdown of agricultural use, in an 
Israeli effort to preserve its environmental integrity as an alternative to conflict.58 
To understand the view of the optimists, it is important to comprehend an 
important perspective on scarcity that optimists bring to the table.  Apart from simply a 
security, economic, technological, or legal viewpoint, optimists promote an 
environmental outlook to examining water.  From the more “dark green” perspective, 
pushing green policies can help to correct humanity’s misguided behavior toward the 
environment.59  Less extreme, and more realistic from an international relations 
standpoint, is the optimists’ perspective that our world has finite and limited resources.60  
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Since resources are limited, in the long run there is little benefit to be had from fighting 
over them.  Instead, the greatest gains come from cooperation.  While subscribers to the 
environmental perspective claim their view requires an alternate and new view of 
national security, the reality is that this view of national security is already in place in 
much of the world.  Many nations already recognize a more broad interpretation of 
national security where economics, resources, and other variables are of the utmost 
importance, and have for some time.  
It is illuminating to look at data that supports the optimistic point of view.  While 
conflicts over resources have certainly occurred, mostly in developing nations, those 
states with significant “lootable resources,” like diamonds and precious metals, are 
significantly more likely to experience war than other nations.61  However, water is not 
easily lootable as it is expensive to transport and requires significant development to 
properly exploit, so nations with water resources are not necessarily more prone to wars.  
Looking at the more than 400 international crises that took place between 1918 and 1994, 
only seven were in any way related to water and there were only four wherein any 
violence took place, and no wars were ever fought over water.62  While some research 
has shown that competition over resources, including access to freshwater resources, can 
have a positive correlation with civil war and armed struggle, this correlation is not 
particularly strong, and it may in fact be that the conflict is caused by external variables, 
and it is not clear that freshwater is the driver of conflict.63  Meanwhile, in the 20th 
century, almost 150 treaties have been concluded about water as a resource.64  In fact, 
looking more closely at some of the very cases often cited as water conflict reveals that 
they in fact result in close cooperation.65 
Although many treaties have been concluded with regard to water resources, there 
are also many more levels of international cooperation with respect to water.  There have 
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been numerous industrial cooperation agreements involving water, and more than 200 of 
cultural or scientific support.66  Clearly, cooperation over water has been of great 
importance.  This is not only because the two parties gain the water benefits of their 
agreements, but the cooperation itself also holds value.  Once meaningful relationships 
between nations are established, there is an immense benefit to both nations in continuing 
the relationship.  Conflict would disrupt the dealings of the cooperating nations, making 
the potential benefits to military victory not worth the cause of the break in the 
relationship.67  Additionally, since the effective exploitation of water resources usually 
involves large-scale projects, much time and money often are devoted to large hydrologic 
systems such as dams, water carriers, power stations, and others.  In conflict, these would 
become high-priority targets.  Even if a water war were successful to achieve additional 
resources, the physical costs to both sides would likely be much larger than any rewards. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Water pessimists and optimists look at the same conditions and draw completely 
different conclusions.  Whereas water is plentiful in many regions, parts of the world are 
severely handicapped in their possession of this valuable resource.  Water stress can be a 
result of many variables, including supply, demand, and management.  No matter the 
cause, the situation puts strain on the nations that have water scarcity.  Large-scale 
efforts, such as the Helsinki Rules and UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, designed to prevent the outbreak of, or 
control the hostilities within, conflicts that involve water, have been largely unsuccessful 
because they lack enforcement mechanisms and the support of those they are supposed to 
govern.  Given these factors, pessimists see that water scarcity will lead to conflict while 
optimists feel the result will be cooperation. 
While both points of view certainly make abstract and theoretical sense, the 
reality of the situation is that pessimists see the situation too narrowly and the optimists’ 
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view more accurately describes the water-scarce world.  Collected real-world data 
support the contention that cooperation occurs more often than conflict.  While small 
scale and internal conflicts may show a positive relationship as resource scarcity rises, the 
correlation is not strong and could, in fact, be due to other variables.  Granted, pessimists 
do not necessarily maintain that conflict is ongoing or inevitable in the near future.  
Instead, they constantly warn of the increased chances of conflict in the future.  However, 
these claims have been made for decades.  Specifically, with regard to water and the 
Middle East, claims of a coming water crisis and the violence it would entail have been 
long predicted.  The only thing that changed as time has gone by is the decade, or 
century, in which this coming crisis is predicted to occur.  Meanwhile, as the optimists 
expect, as water as grown increasingly scarce, the amount of cooperation between nations 
has increased. 
Additionally, the pessimistic outlook on the relationship between water resources 
and security is too narrow to explain the current workings of the international world 
effectively.  National security, as well as economic prosperity, is greatly interdisciplinary.  
Focusing on only the individual aspects of acquiring or losing access to certain 
freshwater resources does not go nearly far enough in explaining the causes of conflict.  
While water may be a target for destruction, an objective of war, or an excuse to raise 
tensions, wars are not fought over water.  Instead, there is much to gain for nations from 
cooperating to share their scarce water resources, while any violent conflict over these 
resources is likely to have a much higher cost than any possible water benefit that could 
be achieved. 
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III. THE JORDAN RIVER BASIN 
Like all wars in the political and strategic reality of our times, wars over 
water do not solve anything. 
—Shimon Peres68 
With the framework of analysis now set with regard to water conflict and 
cooperation, this paper now turns to examine specific regions in the Middle East.  The 
first region that is considered is the Jordan River basin.  While the Jordan River basin is 
relatively small on the world scale, covering only 18,300 square kilometers, it has drawn 
the attention of much of the world for a large part of the last century.69  The Jordan River 
is the smallest watershed shared by more than two countries in the Middle East and  
has been at the center of major international conflicts.  Among the water-strained Middle 
East region, it is the most frequently cited as a cause of conflict and most likely source  
of a coming water war.70  However, while there has certainly been no shortage of 
international conflicts in the basin, water shortages have not been their cause.  Instead, 
this chapter demonstrates that water needs did not play a substantive role in any interstate 
violence in the region, and instead have played a significant role in fostering cooperation 
between nations. 
A. HYDROLOGY 
Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians share the waters of the Jordan.  
However, their individual conditions and their dependence on the Jordan vary 
significantly.  The Jordan River is made up of four main tributaries that have their origins 
in four different countries.  The Upper Jordan is generated by three spring-fed tributaries: 
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the Hasbani in Lebanon, the Banias in Syria, and the Dan in Israel, which is the largest 
tributary.71  The Upper Jordan flows south into the Sea of Galilee.  From there, 
10 kilometers south of the Sea, the Jordan River is met by the Yarmouk River, which has 
its sources in Syria and Jordan.72  Additionally, the Jordan picks up water from springs 
and other more minor tributaries before emptying into the Dead Sea.  Further 
complicating matters is the fact that, for the Jordan as a whole, Syria and Lebanon are 
upstream of Israel, which is an upper riparian to Jordan, while for the Yarmouk, Syria is 
upstream of Lebanon, which is upstream of Israel.73 
Despite the fact that Lebanon and Syria border the Jordan and contain the sources 
of significant contributions to the river, they do not rely much on its waters.  Only about 
5 percent of the total water demand of both Syria and Lebanon is supplied by the Jordan 
River.74  Syria can meet the majority of its water demands from the Euphrates River, 
while Lebanon contains several internal rivers and a high rate of precipitation that can 
supply its needs.  In contrast, Jordan uses the Jordan River to supply the majority of its 
water needs, while Israel uses the Upper Jordan alone for about one-third of its 
consumption, accounting for up to 90 percent of its flow.75, 76  
While surface water may be the most easily observable water in the Basin, there 
are other sources as well.  Groundwater, in general, tends not to cross national boundaries 
and traditionally is used by local populations.77  However, it makes up the majority of 
total water used and withdrawn in the region.78   While there are many sources of 
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groundwater, the ones of primary interest here are those whose recharge or discharge 
crosses boundaries.  West of the Jordan River, three aquifers are the primary sources of 
water; and these basins for the most part recharge in the West Bank and discharge into 
various areas of Israel.79  The coastal aquifer and Gaza aquifer also provide significant 
sources of groundwater to Israel.  Soil water is generally very low in the region due to 
lack of rainfall and is generally not accounted for, while re-used water is very difficult to 
track.80  Manufactured water, freshwater created through desalination, while becoming 
more widespread, is still expensive and not used as a major water source.81   
B. BACKGROUND AND CONFLICTS 
Given the facts that several of the riparians of the Jordan River are extremely 
water scarce, water is distributed very unevenly in the region, and with several other 
geographic realities, it is no wonder there is so much thought devoted to wars over water 
in the Basin.  In addition to the complicated and unevenly distributed water flows in the 
region, several general factors are seen to further exacerbate conflicts over water.  These 
include an arid climate, ongoing political confrontations, and water demands approaching 
or surpassing supply, all of which are present in much of the Jordan River Basin.82  
Additionally, as Israel has established their position as a hydro-hegemon in the area, 
taking more than their supposed equitable share of water resources, on-going conflicts 
could be expected.83   
Before the Second World War, lack of water was not a hindrance to economic 
activity in the region, and certain areas were even famous for their abundance of water 
supplies.84  While water scarcity has always shaped the overall structure of populations in 
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the area, the viewing of water as a foreign policy issue is relatively new.85  When the 
early Zionists began coming to the Middle East en masse before the creation of the 
Jewish State, they saw the land as wasteland to be tamed.86  As part of the national home 
to be created for the Jewish people, economic considerations for settling the area and 
taming the wasteland focused almost entirely on water.87  It is of little surprise that, after 
the creation if Israel in 1948, all water in the nation was nationalized and placed under 
government administration.  In order to protect their homeland, avoid control by outside 
forces, and create a functioning economy, Israelis needed to control their own supplies of 
water.  Because the Arab-Israeli conflict is rooted in Arab rejection of the establishment 
of a Jewish state on Arab soil, it is a conflict that is demographic and territorial in 
nature.88  The nature of the conflict and the scarcity of water in the region means that 
water is central to the root of the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
With the idea that water is part of the root of the Arab-Israeli conflict that defines 
the Jordan River basin established, historical examples of conflicts in the region are 
examined that have had water as a causal factor.  Most prevalent, and perhaps most cited 
of these examples is the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab States of the region.  
Some scholars affirm that the struggle over water was a major factor leading to the Six-
Day War in 1967, and was central to the discussion of all aspects of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.89  In 1953, Israel began diversion projects on the Jordan River, which Syria 
quickly complained about to the United Nations.  Following UN condemnation and a 
failed American effort to reach water-sharing agreements, Israel worked on projects to 
take water out of Lake Tiberius while Jordan started work to tame the Yarmouk River.90   
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While Israel worked on their National Water Carrier, Arab States worked on the 
Headwater Diversion Project.  This construction all took place under the atmosphere of 
continued border disputes between Israel and Syria, believed by some observers to be 
deliberate Israeli actions to provoke retaliation and justify Israeli accusations of Arab 
hostility.91  Several incidents followed in which actual attacks were carried out on water 
projects and tensions increased further.  Eventually, the heightened tensions culminated 
in the Six-Day War.  For those who see the 1967 war as a war over water, the water 
struggle was the key political, technical, and military factor that led to the Arab’s 
escalation leading to the War.92  Arab frustration over their defeats in the water struggle 
strengthened Arab resolve to overcome this loss through comprehensive action.93  
Meanwhile, the Israelis were driven by a need to secure access to ensure the availability 
of water, which was the motivating factor for their drives into the Golan Heights and 
West Bank.94   
Israeli incursions into Lebanon, especially the 1982 invasion, also are sometimes 
looked at as an Israeli attempt to secure further access to precious water resources.  As 
Israel’s population continued to increase, agricultural demands were expanding, and the 
Jordan River basin was severely over utilized, so Israel needed new ways to expand its 
supply of water.95  The high costs of supplying water through desalination, the increasing 
pollution of water supplies, and the failure of other unconventional methods of obtaining 
water meant that Israel looked toward Lebanon, the only neighbor with a water surplus, 
as a means of obtaining water.96  Under the pretext of security concerns over Palestinian 
incursions into Israeli territory, Israel established several security zones in Lebanon, 
culminating in the 1982 invasion where Israeli forces moved all the way to Beirut.  
During the invasion, Israel prevented the use of the Wassani Springs and the Hasbani 
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River.97  Some commentators even claimed the main reason for the invasion was to seize 
control of the Litani River, located entirely within Lebanese territory.98 
Another oft-cited example of conflict over water in the Jordan Basin is the 1987 
Palestinian intifada.  The conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis has largely 
revolved around the bond of people to territory, and water is one, if not the most, 
important material resource tying people to land.99  With this idea in mind, in 1967, Israel 
nationalized all West Bank water, placing limits on water withdrawals from existing 
wells, extensively limited the creation of new wells, as well as closely metered, 
monitored, and controlled the amount of water that could be used.100  The Israeli water 
plans were somewhat defensive in nature, due to the fact that about 30 percent of Israeli 
groundwater originates in the West Bank, but these restrictions resulted in the severe 
decline of several aspects of the occupied territories’ economies.101  In Gaza, Israelis 
were consuming seven times more water per capita than the Palestinians.102  Israeli 
settlements were placed strategically to abut Arab communities and control their land and 
water resources.103  Palestinians strongly objected to the tight controls over their water.  
As water demands by both the Palestinians and Israelis increased, so too did the tension 
of the scarce water resources in the region.  Although water was not the actual spark that 
ignited the intifada, water scarcity in Palestine was one of the reasons the intifada 
started.104 
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C. CONFLICTS RE-EXAMINED 
While the historical examples shown above may appear to be clear-cut examples 
of water scarcity leading to either conflict, the reality of the situations is much more 
complex.  The events explained here are shown in a vacuum where water concerns are 
the primary consideration.   However, when viewed in a wider context, the situations 
change.  It is nearly impossible to identify a sole cause of violent conflict between actors, 
and the question of what someone is willing to go to war over is difficult to answer with 
any degree of certainty.105  However, it can be determined that these conflicts were not 
the wars over water that many have predicted. 
While conflicts involving water projects certainly contributed to rising tensions 
before the 1967 War, they not the sole cause of war, and were not even a primary 
contributor.  While hostilities over the Syrian diversion project did lead to violent 
confrontation, the conflict ended in 1966 when Syrian construction stopped, a full year 
before the war erupted.  Israel’s objectives on their initial attacks were to defeat the 
Egyptians, avoid withdrawal before a real peace was concluded, resist implementation of 
the previous armistice, and maintain close ties to the United States.106  Syria’s increasing 
militarism, Nasser’s recklessness in his attempts to lead the Arabs, Israeli fear of 
elimination, and American involvement in the region were also all contributing factors to 
the war, and were most likely larger contributors to the war than water.107  Even if water 
had played a role in the decision to gain control over certain territories during the war, the 
Israeli government was still largely willing to trade their conquered lands in return for a 
peace treaty.108 
The cases of the invasion of Lebanon and the intifada are not much different from 
the 1967 War in terms of confusion over the motivation water gains provide.  While 
focusing solely on water, it can be seen how their concerns could lead to conflict but, in 
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the wider context, water played little role in the disputes.  Border attacks by Palestinians 
in Lebanon lead to the Israeli invasions of Lebanon.  While Israel did block access to the 
Wazzani and Hasbani, if the motivation of the invasions were in fact water, Israel would 
not have withdrawn under the armed resistance of Lebanese militias.  Additionally, while 
some saw control of the Litani as a goal for Israel’s occupation, the Lebanese government 
themselves dismissed claims that Israel had, in fact, been diverting or using the waters of 
the Litani River.109  For the Palestinians, the intifada certainly had water as a grievance 
contributing to poor living conditions and a weak economy.  However, the ultimate 
causes of the revolt were poverty, refugee camps, hatred of occupation, and primarily, 
Palestinian humiliation from the previous 20 years.110  While water may have been a 
factor in these conflicts, neither of these clashes were wars over water. 
D. COOPERATION 
Turning from water resources as a source of conflict, the paper now looks at 
historical examples where water resources have served as a means of cooperation.  
Attempts at the creation of Basin wide water management plans have been tried many 
times during the Arab-Israeli conflict, including efforts before Israel was even a state.  
These plans and studies had widely varying outlooks including the Ionides Plan, a 1939 
British study that noted that water concerns would limit further immigration to Palestine 
while the 1944 French Lodermilk Plan said that proper water management would allow 
for millions more refugees to be taken into the region.111  Perhaps most famous of these 
early water sharing ideas was the Johnston Plan of 1955.  While Johnston was able to 
obtain agreements from both Arab and Israelis on the practical aspects of a water sharing 
agreement, the plan still collapsed not due to the technical aspects of the water 
agreements but the political animosity between parties at the time.112  For the most part, 
these potential agreements and means of cooperation failed because they were attempts 
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by outsiders to achieve peace that were not necessarily connected to the desires of the 
participants.  However, more recent developments, such as integrated and more 
comprehensive hydrological studies as well as political changes in the context of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, have allowed further cooperation in the region. 
The first of these examples is the peace treaty concluded between Israel and 
Jordan in 1994.  When these peace talks opened in 1991, the region was suffering a heavy 
drought and water became a motivating factor for the talks themselves, with one observer 
even noting that Jordan was being pushed into peace because of water.113  In this 
instance, the joint will to reach a peace agreement and the water needs on both sides of 
the negotiating table facilitated an amicable solution.114  This peace treaty ended the legal 
state of war that had existed between the two nations for more than 40 years and, while 
water agreements were not the only goal of the treaty, they were a major contributor, and 
constituted one of the five regional subjects of the negotiation process.  The treaty spelled 
out allocations for several water sources shared between the two nations and recognized 
that water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs, so cooperative projects are 
needed to alleviate water shortages.  As time has passed, some relations outlined in the 
treaty have not been particularly smooth, but the water relations between Israel and 
Jordan have been maintained, validating the notion that water is a source of 
cooperation.115 
The peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians from 1993 to 1998 are another 
example where water has potentially served as a means of cooperation instead of conflict.  
While final agreements on water rights were postponed until the Final Status 
arrangements, there has still been much progress toward cooperation fueled by water.  
Leading up to the 1993 agreement, the Israeli/Palestine Center for Research and 
Information held simulated negotiations over water and cosponsored an international 
conference on water, while other organizations performed similar roles.116  The 1993 
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Declaration of Principles and Interim Self-government Agreement created a Palestinian 
Water Administration Authority, and focused on cooperation in the field of water.117  The 
1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza strip took the large step of 
Israeli recognition of water rights, as well as the creation of a Joint Water Committee 
established to manage and protect water for the interests of both parties.118  As more 
territory has been transferred to Palestinian control, especially under the 1998 agreement 
reached at Wye Plantation, the correlation between territory and the location of water 
resources has been more apparent, with defensive hydro-strategic considerations falling 
by the wayside while joint management of resources and creative solutions to problems 
become more prominent.119 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
While the nations that border the Jordan River all use its waters, it is not the only 
source of this precious resources throughout the Basin.  Lebanon’s internal rivers and 
relativly high rate of precipitation, Syria’s location on the Euphrates, and the 
groundwaters of Israel and Palestine provide other sources of water, but the Jordan ties 
them all together.  As these countries, and Jordan, have shared interest in the Jordan 
River Basin, they are all linked together.  While the Arab-Israeli conflict has largely 
dominated the region for more than 50 years, the scarce water in the region has not been 
the source of fighting between these countries, and has in fact been a source of 
cooperation. 
Although there have been no true water wars between the states that share the 
Jordan, it cannot be said that there have not been severe confrontations over its use.  
However, these confrontations only further illuminate why wars over water are not 
practical.  Mounting tensions leading to the war in 1967 saw the relatively rare 
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phenomenon of actual violence over water resources.  Both the Arabs and the Israelis 
attempted to construct large-scale projects that would help supply their own water needs, 
but deny water to other nations.  Clearly, water was viewed as a strategic resource.  
However, these large-scale projects were attacked by both sides.  Water became a target 
of both large- and small-scale military actions, which not only showed the vulnerability 
of water projects to attack, but also that these contentious water policies were not 
economically worthwhile.  As an additional example, even though it is shown that 
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon was not water based, had it been, the invasion and the 
attacks it provoked would have been far more costly, both in terms of money and lives, 
than any water that potentially could have been pilfered.   
Cooperation, on the other hand, benefits all those who attempt to share in the 
resources of the region.  Cooperation has occurred along the Jordan as water has become 
seen less as a strategic resource that needs to be controlled, and more as a finite part of 
the environmental that needs to be shared.  In fact, times of even greater scarcity can lead 
to greater cooperation, as the drought leading up to the 1994 treaty between Jordan and 
Israel has shown.  Additionally, while attempts by outsiders to implement plans of shared 
management and joint responsibility have largely failed in the past, more recent events 
that have more heavily involved those nations with stakes in the matter, or actually been 
undertaken by the nations involved, have been vastly more successful.  Cooperation over 
water can help build relationships and trust between the countries even when other realms 
of the political environment are not particularly friendly.  A current example is the 
Executive Action Team made up of Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians who have met 
uninterrupted since 1992 as part of the Joint Water Committee created in the Interim 
Agreement, and has contributed to trust building between the parties while focusing on 
water issues.120  
There have been no wars over water in the Jordan River Basin.  Instead, 
cooperation has largely been the dominant way to deal with the scarce resources in the 
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region.  While there have been several supposed examples of water wars in the region, on 
closer inspection water was not the reason for the conflict.  Cooperation, however, has 
been widespread through the region, and has increased significantly in more recent times.  
This is, unfortunately, not to say that there have not been outbreaks of violence associated 
with claiming water resources.  However, in the case of interstate violence, they episodes 
were short lived, without further escalation, and infrequent.  More internal forms of water 
related conflict, such as that between the Iraelis and occupied Palestinian territory, have 





















IV. THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES RIVER BASIN 
If there is a political will for peace water will not be a hindrance.  If you 
want reasons to fight, water will give you ample opportunities. 
—Uri Shamir121  
Despite the vast difference between the Tigris-Euphrates and Jordan River Basins, 
they do share some similarities.  Like the Jordan, the nations that share the Tigris-
Euphrates Basin have existed in a state of escalated water tensions for the last 50 years 
and, like the Jordan, many see the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers as a potential flash point 
for future wars over water.  In fact, some American agencies have ranked the Tigris-
Euphrates Basin as the second most likely source of water wars behind only the 
Jordan.122  However, as this chapter shows, like the Jordan Basin, the pessimistic view of 
conflict in the Tigris-Euphrates region is misplaced.  While there have been increased 
tensions and even near conflicts over the supposed use of these rivers, attempts to utilize 
the rivers’ resources have not led to violent confrontations.  Instead, cooperation has been 
the more likely resort.  Where tensions did flare, they were largely the result of other, 
non-water related issues between the countries involved.  
A. HYDROLOGY 
While the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers are separate entities, they are examined 
together here because of the close proximity of their origin, they both flow through the 
same countries, and they are joined, both naturally and through development projects, 
before flowing into the Persian Gulf.  The Euphrates River is the longest river in 
Southwestern Asia and begins in the mountains of eastern Turkey from the Kara Su and 
Murat tributaries.  From there, the Euphrates follows a torturous path through Syria, 
where it is joined by three other tributaries, most significantly the Khabur, and then flows 
through Iraq.  No water is added to the river in Iraq until it merges with the Tigris.123   
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Overall, the Euphrates receives 90 percent of its flow from Turkey, with the remaining 10 
percent coming from Syria.124 The Tigris River, the second largest in Southwest Asia, 
also begins in the mountains of eastern Turkey, but follows a much more direct path to its 
conclusion.  From Turkey, the Tigris briefly forms the Turkish-Syrian border before 
flowing into Iraq, where its four main tributaries join the river, the sources of which 
begin in both Turkey and Iran.125  The Tigris receives 53 percent of its flow from Turkey 
and the remaining portion comes from Iran and Iraq.126   The Tigris and Euphrates meet 
to form the Shatt al-Arab, which flows south approximately 100 miles before it empties 
into the Persian Gulf.  Although some of the Tigris’s tributaries rise in Iran, and the lower 
Shatt al-Arab forms the border between Iraq and Iran, this paper does not include Iran in 
the analysis of water conflicts and cooperation in the region due to the fact that Iran’s 
tensions with the Tigris and Euphrates riparians largely is not over the use of water 
resources. 
As the largest two rivers in the region, covering an area almost twenty times 
larger than the Jordan River Basin, there are great disparities between the conditions and 
the use of their waters in the countries they flow through.  Additionally, a disparity 
concerning actual water data exists.  There are several possible reasons for this, including 
possible environmental factors due to the great seasonal fluctuations and wide annual 
variations in precipitation and river flows.  Seasonally, the Tigris has its greatest 
discharge from March through May, accounting for 53 percent of the annual flow while 
the Euphrates’ high flow is in April and May, making up 42 percent of its yearly 
discharge.127  Accounting errors or unfamiliarity with regional situations can also lead to 
data inconsistencies.  Additionally, there could be a strategic component to these 
disparities where knowledge could be seen as power and the states involved spread  
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whatever information will most serve their own causes.128  Where wide differences in 
data appear, this paper attempts to use the numbers that provide the more conservative 
estimates or come from the more recent data. 
While none of the states that share the Tigris and Euphrates are “water rich” by 
world standards, they do fare considerably better than most other countries in the region.  
Measured in terms of cubic meters per year per capita, approximate water availability in 
Iraq, Turkey, and Syria are 2,000, 1,800, and 1400, respectively.129   All three countries 
rely on the waters of these rivers for irrigation, hydro-electricity, and regional 
development plans, but to varying degrees.  The importance of the rivers varies widely 
with the Tigris and Euphrates making up 28.5 percent of Turkey’s total water surface 
flow, and the extreme estimates saying the Euphrates alone accountants for up to 86 
percent of Syria’s total available water while both rivers provide 98 percent of Iraq’s total 
supply.130 131 132  However, more conservative estimates put both Syria and Iraq’s 
dependency ratio, the percentage of total renewable water resources originating outside 
the country, at between 50 and 75 percent.133   All three countries make extensive use of 
the rivers and have plans for even more heavy use in the future that go far above the 
available supply.  Together, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq’s future consumption targets for the 
Euphrates Basin total almost one and a half times its potential, while the target for the 
Tigris is 112 percent its potential.134   With these numbers in mind, there appears to be 
clear potential for future conflict over these waters, which is exactly what the pessimists 
argue when discussing recent and future events. 
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B. BACKGROUND AND CONFLICTS 
As would be expected in this region that has hosted great civilizations since the 
beginning of history, there is a long record of water use in the basins of the Tigris and 
Euphrates Rivers.  In the arid environment, even the earliest civilizations relied heavily 
on a well-developed and maintained control over water.  While these early peoples relied 
heavily on the Tigris and Euphrates, their consumption did not even come close to the 
full capacity of the rivers.  Even into modern times, nations were essentially free to make 
use of the water resources as they saw fit.  However, the free use of both rivers has 
created issues that strongly affect the region today.  While the vast majority of the 
sources of the basins arise in Turkey, Iraq, the most downstream nation, has historically 
made the most use of the waters while contributing the least to their flows.   
It was not until the second half of the 20th century that Iraq has had to compete 
with the ever-increasing water demands of both Syria and Turkey.135  Despite the fact 
that both Syria and Iraq have a historical claim to rights to use the rivers, Turkey takes a 
different view.  While both Syria and Iraq see the rivers as international waterways that 
should be treated as an integrated entity by all riparians, Turkey sees them as 
transboundary rivers.136  In this light, the rivers fall under the exclusive sovereignty of 
Turkey until they flow across the borders.137   The Turks have expressed the view that 
they have the right to do anything they like with the waters, and the flows that reach their 
riparian neighbors are a gift from Turkey.  They believe Syria and Iraq can claim no more 
right to Turkey’s waters than Turkey can to Iraqi oil.138   The simple fact that Syria is 
downstream of Turkey, and Iraq is downstream of them both, means that all nations were 
forced to undertake unilateral efforts at ensuring they had sufficient access to water, a 
situation that could easily lead to conflict. 
                                                 
135  Eyal Benvenisti, “Water Conflicts During the Occupation of Iraq,” The American Journal of 
International Law 97, no. 4 (Oct 2003): 860–872, 865. 
136  Ali Akanda, Sarah Freeman and Maria Placht, “al Nakhlah,” The Tigris-Euphrates River Basin: 
Mediating a Path Towards Regional Water Stability, The Fletcher School, Spring 2007, 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/archives/spring2007/placht-2.pdf (accessed Mar 7, 2011), 2. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Zawahri, “Stabilizing Iraq’s Water Supply,” 1046. 
 37
As each state unilaterally worked to develop the rivers within its territory, little 
care was taken for the impact it might have on downstream riparians.139  This condition 
obviously had the greatest effect on Iraq, which came to a head when, in 1974 and 1975, 
both Turkey and Syria were filling the reservoir behind the Keban and Tabqa dams, and 
since this happened during a dry time of the year, the flow of the Euphrates to Iraq 
essentially stopped.140  Understandably disturbed by this development, Iraq called a 
meeting of the Arab League to help alleviate the situation.  However, the Arab League 
was unable to negotiate a settlement and, as a result, Iraq threatened to bomb the Tabqa 
dam in Syria.141  Syria and Iraq both massed forces on their borders and Saudi mediation 
was needed to secure an agreement in which Syria released water from the dam to Iraq.  
A less serious, but similar, incident occurred in 1983, when Syria blamed Turkey for the 
drop in the water level in the Tabqa Dam.   
While the incidents of 1975 and 1983 were resolved relatively quickly, Turkey’s 
commitment to a much larger project would have much more far-reaching effects.  In 
1977, Turkey announced plans for the largest water development project in the history of 
the region.  The Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP) consists of 22 dams and 
19 hydroelectric projects for irrigation, power, and socio-economic development.142  The 
GAP is huge in scale with projects on both the Tigris and Euphrates covering nine 
Turkish provinces and an area greater than 75,000 square kilometers.  Not only is the 
project intended to provide additional energy and water for agriculture, but because the 
region being developed lags behind the rest of Turkey in most social indicators, it is 
hoped that GAP will contribute significantly to the development of the region as a 
whole.143  Because this region is home to the majority of the Kurds, it is also hoped this 
project can help remove the so-called “Kurdish Problem” from Turkey.  However, while  
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the GAP has provided strong political momentum and pride in Turkey, as well as great 
hopes for the future, it has also led to increasing tensions among the riparians of the 
Tigris and Euphrates. 
Despite Turkey’s grand plans for development of both the Tigris and Euphrates 
Rivers, there was little opposition from either Syria or Iraq until the 1980s, when efforts 
changed from a focus on hydroelectricity to more development- and agricultural-based 
plans.144  While hydroelectric developments did little to stem the water flow to both Syria 
and Iraq, and indeed even provided significant benefits by regulating the highly seasonal 
river flows, agricultural use of the waters would mean a significant smaller portion of 
water being passed to those downstream.  Syria and Iraq, fearful of a reduced water 
supply, objected to the World Bank that the projects would cause them harm, and were 
successful in their bid to block World Bank funding of GAP related developments.  
These financial tactics caused significant delays in large projects, as well as contributing 
to many of Turkey’s economic problems.145  However, Turkey was able to obtain its own 
financing for the GAP and, although progress was slowed, it was not stopped. 
Financial tools have not been the only weapons used against Turkey in the 
conflicts caused by tensions of scarce water resources in the area.  Syria felt it needed to 
force Turkey’s hand on the water issue and, although Syria was militarily and 
economically unable to force a showdown with Turkey, they realized the security and 
stability of Turkey was vulnerable to Kurdish action.146  Syria lent its support to the 
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), an armed group that actively fights against Turkey for 
the creation of an independent Kurdish state.  In 1983, Turkey publically announced their 
anger over Syrian support of the PKK and, in 1986, the Syrians publically linked water 
and security, saying they would only agree to security protocols if Turkey entered into a 
formal water agreement.147  In 1987, Turkey agreed to maintain an average flow of the 
Euphrates at the Syrian border of 500 m3/s in return for Syria’s pledge to end its support 
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of PKK.  Syria continued its support PKK activities, however, which came to a head in 
1998.  In October, with the background of water and the support of anti-Turkish groups, 
Turkey threatened military action against Syria unless it ended its support of PKK 
activities.148   While Syria acquiesced to Turkey’s demands and an agreement was 
signed, it largely did not solve the ongoing disagreements between the two nations.  
C. FRAMEWORK FOR RE-EVALUATION 
With the context established above, and the near conflicts that unilateral water 
development have seemed to cause in the region, water pessimists argue that hydro 
politics in the Tigris and Euphrates Basins have been a recipe for conflict.  However, the 
situations detailed above, and the arguments of the pessimists, focus entirely on water.  
Examined through a broader context the idea of water being the major contributor to 
regional tensions is flawed.  The four-part framework established by Dolatyar and Gray 
provides the basis for analysis in showing why the pessimistic view is wrong.  The facts 
of the analysis are that water shortages are not actually present in any of the riparians, 
water problems within countries are largely a result of allocation within each state itself, 
water does not hold the level of strategic importance that the situations detailed ascribe to 
it, and that there have been ongoing efforts to share water between the riparians.149   
These efforts at cooperation are described in the next section, but evidence for the rest of 
the framework is outlined below. 
Unlike the countries that share the Jordan River Basin, those that share the Tigris 
and Euphrates do not face an imminent shortage of water.  While it was previously 
established that none of the countries could be called water rich, none of them are water 
poor either.  Turkey has a renewable annual freshwater capacity of 234 km3 annually, of 
which it withdraws just 17 percent each year.150  Syria and Iraq are not nearly as well 
endowed with water as Turkey, but still have adequate resources.  Of their available 
water, Syria withdraws 76 percent of their available supply while Iraq withdraws just 56 
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percent.151  Syria even goes so far as to have net exports of the equivalent of more than 4 
billion m3 per year in virtual water, the amount of water necessary for producing the food 
they export.152  Claims of water shortages often resolve around projected needs, but these 
often do not materialize.  As one example, whereas Syria planned to irrigate over 600,000 
acres of land from the Tabqa damn, the quality and salinity of the land have allowed 
irrigation of only approximately one-third of this area.153  Clearly the region is not in, or 
facing, a time of water need or scarcity. 
Because none of these countries are actually facing a water shortage, problems 
they have in terms of water availability are due to problems of allocation within the state, 
and not of distribution between states.  This can be easily seen by the fact that despite 
having enough water in both Syria and Iraq just over 80 percent of the population has 
access to safe drinking water.154  It can also be seen through the distribution of water use.  
In Syria, 3 percent of total water is used by the domestic sector, 2 percent by industry, 
while a staggering 95 percent is used for agriculture.155  Similarly, Iraq’s domestic sector 
uses 3 percent, industry 5 percent, while agriculture accounts for 92 percent of use.156  
This large devotion of resources is partly due to the fact that, historically, the small farms 
that make use of the waters in both countries have been sources of unrest for the 
established regime so they are plied with water in an attempt to gain loyalty.157  In 
addition to allocating water to earn devotion, the threat of water scarcity can also serve to 
mobilize support for the government against the supposed foreign enemies that are 
causing internal problems so the efficient allocation of water may not even be a 
priority.158   
                                                 
151 Gleick et al., The World’s Water, 145. 
152 The World Bank, “Making the Most of Scarcity,” 144. 
153 Carkoglu and Eder, Water Politics in the Middle East, 57. 
154 Gleick et al., The World’s Water, 244. 
155 Ibid., 232–234. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Carkoglu and Eder, Water Politics in the Middle East, 57. 
158 Ibid., 65. 
 41
In order to see the tensions and conflicts of the Basin in terms of conflict over 
water one has to ignore the larger security situation surrounding the problems.  When 
these situations are examined in a wider context it is clear that water does not hold the 
strategic importance needed for these conflicts to be about competition for water.  Syria 
and Iraq have complained that the GAP is a means of building Turkish dominance over 
them and the Arab media has even portrayed the filling of the Ataturk dam as a 
belligerent act.159  However, Turkey has continued to see the GAP as a project for 
important regional development and even notes that the regulation of flow many of their 
projects provide are beneficial to both Syria and Iraq.  While Syria was supporting the 
PKK against Turkey, Iraq did not get involved because other issues had much greater 
strategic importance than water.  Iraq was fighting the Iran-Iraq war at the time and after 
Syria closed its border with Iraq, Turkey provided the only available outlet for 
distributing its oil.160  It was only after Turkey and Iraq’s relations soured that Syria and 
Iraq could again join together on the water issue to oppose Turkey, so clearly water was 
not the top priority that some pessimists give it.  Regional rivalries between the three 
nations have also manifested themselves in other ways—such as when Turkey and Syria 
sided with the allied forces against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War of the 1990s, the 
Turkish-Syrian territorial dispute over Alexandretta, Syrian and Iraqi competition over 
Ba’athist leadership, attempts at regional leadership, and other tension filled relations—
but none of these are over water.  While tensions and conflicts certainly exist among the 
three nations, they are not mainly due to water. 
D. EFFORTS AT COOPERATION 
There is no comprehensive agreement between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq to share 
the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.  However, there is a long history of water 
agreements in the region.  The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne included provisions providing 
that Iraq must be consulted before Turkey embarked on any hydraulic projects.  The 1946 
Treaty of Friendship and Neighborly Relations between Turkey and Iraq again required 
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Turkey to consult Iraq of planned infrastructure along the Tigris or Euphrates and 
allowed Iraqi construction of meteorological and geographic surveys inside Turkey.  In 
1987, Turkey and Syria concluded a protocol on technical and economic cooperation that 
promised to average a 500 m3 per second yearly flow of the Euphrates from Turkey to 
Syria in return for Syria’s cooperation on border security.  Although this was regarded as 
a temporary agreement, the 500m3 per second promise was confirmed twice more in 
ministerial meetings between the two countries in 1992 and 1993.161  While there have 
still been some Syrian complaints, Turkey has largely met and often significantly 
exceeded its promised flow.162  Syria and Iraq signed an agreement that no matter what 
the flow of the Euphrates from Turkey, Syria would keep 42 percent and give 58 percent 
to Iraq.  Despite tense relations between the two, Syria has maintained the rates agreed 
upon. 
In addition to the agreements between the nations of the Tigris and Euphrates, the 
three countries have also been actively engaged in technical consultations mostly through 
various groups known as the Joint Technical Committee (JTC).  In 1962, Syria and Iraq 
formed a Joint Technical Committee, but it had a somewhat limited role as there were no 
major projects during the time the committee stayed together.163  In 1972 and 1973, a 
JTC met several times to discuss how to fill the Tabqa and Keban dams without affecting 
downstream irrigation.  While no agreement was reached as a result of these meetings, 
they did facilitate a series of trips to various sights within the countries involved and 
aided information sharing.164  In 1980, Iraq and Turkey created a new JTC that was 
joined by Syria in 1983.  This committee met a total of sixteen times before disbanding in 
1993.  This JTC again did not fulfill its goal of formulating a proposal for the sharing of 
waters to create a trilateral regime for efficient water utilization, mostly due to problems 
of definition of transboundary and international waterways.  However, while they did not 
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achieve their goal, the importance of these meetings should not be understated because of 
the great information exchange it allowed as well as providing an important channel for 
communication.165  In 2008, the three countries again agreed to restart JTC meetings, 
which has resulted in the memorandum to strengthen communication, development of 
joint flow monitoring stations, and an exchange between Turkey and Iraq to trade oil for 
help curbing terrorist activity.166 
Current conditions in the region look favorably to continued cooperation in the 
future and perhaps even progress toward a comprehensive water-sharing agreement.  A 
new plan to share water effectively would mean that Syria and Iraq could drop their 
complaints about the GAP to the World Bank, which could greatly improve Turkey’s 
ability to gain outside financing, both from the World Bank and other large organizations, 
to complete their plans.167   Syria has lost any leverage it previously held over Turkey by 
giving up their support of Kurdish rebels working inside Turkey.  Since, as one Syrian 
official noted, their plan now is simply be nice to Turkey and hope for the best, they are 
ready to negotiate an agreement.168  In Iraq, a major portion of the legitimacy the new 
and relatively weak government will derive will come from providing the basic public 
goods, water and electricity, that an effective water sharing agreement will help bring.169 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
A pessimistic viewpoint argues that Syria, Turkey, and Iraq only negotiate “when 
water levels have been so low as to seriously threaten their national security.”170  While 
this view is flawed both on the concepts of security and the actual water availability of 
the region, it does bring about a positive point for optimism in the region.  Even when the  
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nations may have felt threatened, they still turn to negotiation and cooperation.  Since 
there have never been any wars fought over water between these countries, they are 
clearly choosing cooperation over conflict. 
By and large, the countries have chosen cooperation over conflict over the Tigris 
and Euphrates Rivers.  Unlike the Jordan, this region has not seen any violence over the 
shared use of the rivers.  While there have been heightened tensions, these confrontations 
have largely not been about water.  While pessimists point to the region as another area 
of conflict and potential water wars, their analysis is flawed because they give water a 
strategic importance it does not merit: there is not a water shortage, problems of lack of 
water are due to domestic allocation and not interstate distribution, and there have been 
many attempts at cooperation.  While there have been no comprehensive management 
plans involving all three nations, there have been many other agreements reached.  Many 
of the attempts to work through committees have not been as successful as hoped, but 
progress continues on that front.  Additionally, the political situations in the region are 












V. WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 
These societies, being based on a temporary resource, face the problem of 
being temporary themselves. 
—Charles Bowden171 
Up to this point, this paper has largely focused on disputing the idea that water 
scarcity among those who share international waterways leads to conflict and instead 
showing how it leads to cooperation.  Now, however, it takes a different path in 
investigating the water situation facing the countries of the Arabian Peninsula.  These 
countries do not share surface waterways and instead focus primarily on groundwater and 
desalination for their water needs.  Heavy dependence on nonrenewable groundwater and 
massive investment in the production and transportation of freshwater sources have 
created the illusion of plenty even in the very arid conditions of the region.  These 
conditions are not sustainable and cracks in the fantasy of abundance have already 
formed.  Unfortunately, while water has largely not been a major contributor to unrest to 
this point, future shortages could make water the most politically divisive issue in the 
region 
A. HYDROLOGY 
Unlike the areas previously discussed, the Arabian Peninsula is bereft of rivers, 
lakes, or streams.  It is mainly a severe desert environment containing some of the largest 
and hottest sand dune deserts in the world, where only highly adapted desert plants grow 
without groundwater brought up from aquifers.172  Rainfall in the region is scant and 
irregular with averages ranging from 70 to 130 mm per year.  However, the averages 
mean little since many locales can receive no rain at all for months or even years at a 
time.  Flash flooding can occur in certain areas during periods of high intensity and short 
duration rains.  These floodwaters generate the only surface runoff in the region and are 
                                                 
171  Speaking of fossil groundwater depeltion in Charles Bowden, From Killing the Hidden Waters, 
University of Texas Press, Austin, 
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~cses/csessite/restricted/EreadDocs/killing_waters.pdf (accessed Mar 15, 2011), 5. 
172 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, 167. 
 46
used for flood irrigation, stored behind dams, and recharge the shallow aquifers that dot 
the area.173  There are more than 200 dams in the region that function for both flood 
protection and groundwater recharge.174  Runoffs are much more pronounced in the 
mountain ridges of the west, southwest, and southeastern portions of the peninsula, while 
the remainder of the region has very little relief and poorly defined drainage patterns. 
In addition to the very small amount of rain, the Arabian Peninsula has alluvial 
aquifers, those aquifers that are generally shallow and renewable, throughout the region.  
This groundwater is the only renewable water source for several of the countries in the 
peninsula.175  Saudi Arabia contains the largest water reserves in alluvial aquifers, 
accounting for almost 65 percent of the total capacity in the region.176  These water 
sources have been used by the region’s inhabitants for centuries and have been an 
important tool for survival in the inhospitable climate of the region.  Today they are used 
largely for domestic and irrigation purposes; however, more recent developments mean 
these resources are being used faster than they are being recharged, and as such provide 
less usable water than they once did. 
There are also large amounts of water stored deep under the region in a series of 
deep aquifers that hold water from hundreds or thousands of years ago.  While there is 
some debate over whether some of these aquifers are recharged at all, it is generally 
regarded that these sources are either not recharged or recharged at such a slow rate that 
they are viewed as nonrenewable.177  These aquifers store enormous quantities of water 
and are the only dependable source of water for Saudi Arabia and some of the other states 
in the peninsula.178  Despite their size, the fact that these aquifers are essentially 
nonrenewable means they will only provide limited quantities of water.  Additionally, the 
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water quality found in these aquifers varies widely from place to place, and increased 
depletion of these water reserves often means the quality degrades as levels become 
progressively lower.  Also, due to their size, these large aquifers often cross international 
boundaries.  However, problems of competition and cooperation between the nations of 
the Arabian Peninsula will not be discussed here and instead the focus will remain on 
domestic use and its effects. 
In addition to the naturally occurring sources of water available to the countries of 
the Arabian Peninsula, many of the states in the region have undertaken substantial 
efforts at providing additional freshwater through desalination.  Desalination involves 
taking either salt or brackish water and generally either heating it or pushing it through 
special membranes in order to remove impurities, such as salt, to create additional 
freshwater.  Kuwait was the first country in the region to adopt seawater desalination, 
beginning in 1957.  Saudi Arabia did not commission its first desalination plant until 
1970, but has since become the world leader.  Because it is a relatively expensive way to 
produce freshwater, only those states with sufficient wealth and a severe lack of water 
turn to desalination as a viable option.  Many of the oil rich countries in the region fit this 
description well, and it is little surprise that the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) account for 57 percent of global desalination capacity, with Saudi Arabia leading 
the world in this regard.179    
B. WATER AVAILABILITY AND USE IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 
Examination of the availability of water in the region reveals startling information 
about the degree of water scarcity in the region.  While earlier examples cited in this 
paper made reference to countries that are categorized as facing water scarcity, when 
referring to nations in the peninsula it is more of an issue of absolute scarcity.  This is 
when the annual per capita water supplies are less than 500m3.180  In regard to renewable 
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water resources, several states are well below this level with Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen all having just 100m3 available while 
Bahrain is slightly better off with 160m3 and Oman has 400m3.181  However, many of 
these states get a majority of their water from other sources.  For Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and UAE the vast majority of their total water resources available come from 
nonrenewable groundwater.182  The nonrenewable sources provide a huge reserve of 
water, but they are being depleted at a rapid rate.  While almost every country on the 
Arabian Peninsula uses much more water than is renewed annually, Saudi Arabia, UAE, 
and Kuwait provide startling examples of just how much nonrenewable water is used.  
Saudi Arabia uses almost 8.5 times more water than is renewable, UAE uses more than 
15 times, and Kuwait uses 22 times more water than is renewable each year.183  With 
these totals in mind, it is no wonder that many fear that there is a severe over reliance on 
nonrenewable groundwater.  A clear example of this problem occurred in the 1990s when 
one aquifer under Riyadh had become so deep it could no longer be pumped.184 
Desalination is used extensively to make up for shortfalls in the water supply and 
countries in the region have devoted massive resources to this undertaking.  The UAE has 
spent up to $4 billion a year on the production of desalinated water while Saudi Arabia 
spent about $17 billion building desalination plants up to 2008 with a recent addition of a 
$4 billion plant.185  Power plants and desalination plants are often combined together and 
the linked plants in Saudi Arabia account for more than half of the country’s domestic oil 
consumption.186   From these massive investments, desalination in the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia, the two largest producers of desalinated water, provide hundreds of millions of 
m3 of water, but it is still not enough to meet demand.  As the data provided in the 
                                                 
181 World Bank, “Making the Most of Scarcity,” 162, 172, 178, 180, 182, 188, and 192. 
182 Ibid., 143. 
183 Ibid., 145. 
184 Jon B. Alterman and Michael Dziuban, “Clear Gold: Water as a Strategic Resource in the Middle 
East,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, A Report of the CSIS Middle East Program, Dec 2010, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/101213_Alterman_ClearGold_web.pdf (accessed Mar 14, 2011), 10. 
185 Dziuban, “Scarcity and Strategy,” 2. 
186 Alterman and Dziuban, “Clear Gold,” 3. 
 49
previous paragraph indicates, even with the huge influx of freshwater desalination 
creates, nations are still heavily relying on other sources, so clearly desalination is 
currently not even close to freeing these nations from their dependence on nonrenewable 
groundwater.  Desalination is the great hope for the region, but even as desalination 
capacity grows, the demand for water in the region grows even faster.187  In Saudi 
Arabia, demand for water has increased by 500 percent in the last 25 years and is 
expected to increase by another 200 percent in the next 20.188  Abu Dhabi’s water 
demand has doubled in the last decade.189  Kuwait’s current daily water consumption 
totals come to within one million gallons of its total capacity, which even with the 
addition of planned construction, will not be able to meet demand into 2013.190 
There are several reasons that demand for water continues to rise at increasing 
rates despite the great cost and depleting groundwater in the peninsula.  The great 
inefficiency of use in the region is mostly due to the political nature water holds in the 
region.  While the impacts of this political outlook on water are discussed in the next 
section, here the focus is on the effects from the general idea that abundant oil wealth 
among the countries of the GCC have allowed governments to make water seem 
plentiful.  As a result, both people and governments treat water as an infinite resource 
despite its great scarcity.  In these countries, large subsidies keep the price of water either 
free or significantly below its value, and as a result, users tend to demand it even more 
intensely.191  The major result from this is that many nations have attempted to create a 
condition of food self-sufficiency or food security and agriculture is used extensively in 
the region. 
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Attempts at creating so-called food security, which in this case is really a function 
of water security, is really a matter of semantics.  Security is ensuring sufficient physical 
and economic access to water, while self-sufficiency is the attempt to satisfy needs 
through domestic production.192  There is strong political motivation for the countries in 
the peninsula to attempt, or at least make the appearance, of attempting to achieve self-
sufficiency.  To this end, extremely wasteful and inefficient water practices have been put 
in place.  Despite the arid conditions, and more efficient ways of obtaining water, which 
are detailed shortly, the so-called “green revolution” that peaked in the 1980s and 90s 
resulted in dramatic changes in the region.  Massive resources were devoted to 
agriculture and irrigation expanded dramatically.  In just over 45 years, Qatar expanded 
its arable land 18 times while UAE and Kuwait expanded theirs more than 14 times.193  
Saudi Arabia quadrupled its food production and became the world’s sixth-largest 
exporter of wheat.194  These undertakings severely depleted the region’s groundwater 
sources, and while steps were taken to slow these trends, the inefficient use of water 
continues.  While desalinated water is expensive, only 25 percent is used for drinking and 
sanitation in Abu Dhabi, with the rest going to domestic landscaping, industry, and other 
uses.195  While the Saudis have aimed to phase out wheat production, many wheat 
farmers have merely switched to growing fodder crops that require from 4 to 16 times 
more water than wheat.196  Saudi Arabia also still runs the world’s largest integrated 
dairy farm, where 2,300 gallons of water are needed to produce each gallon of milk.197  
Agricultural products often are sold at 30% of actual production costs in order to be  
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competitive with foreign imports.198  As a result, of all these inefficiencies, agriculture 
makes up 70 percent of water use in the GCC while contributing less than 1 percent to 
GDP.199 
Related to this idea of dependence on agriculture is the concept of virtual water.  
Virtual water is the water contained within products, especially wheat, that when 
imported, allow nations to endure despite their scarce water resources by taking water 
from areas of abundance.200  The specific value of virtual water is difficult to calculate 
because required water inputs can vary greatly from place to place, but the concept is 
valid for showing the relative costs of water or the amount of water shortfalls present in a 
region through how much virtual water they import.201  With this in mind, in spite of the 
great regional attempts to promote agriculture, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula still 
effectively import a large quantity of water through food.  Saudi Arabia leads the region 
in the importation of virtual water, importing the equivalent of more than 13 billion m3 of 
water, which is more than 500 m3 for each person in the country.202  Other nations import 
significantly less due to their smaller populations, but as far as virtual water relative to 
population size UAE leads the way with an astounding 975 m3 of water imported for each 
citizen.203  The importation of water itself is certainly not a bad thing, and in fact is an 
effective means of obtaining water at an efficient cost.  This is especially true when 
comparing the cost of desalinated water, at about 50 cents for each m3 at the low end, 
with water that is obtained for about 7 cents per m3 in other parts of the world.204  
However, by importing virtual water, countries on the Arabian Peninsula are effectively  
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able to allow previous assumptions about the infinite quantity of water to continue and 
continue to act politically as if they do not have a water shortfall even as these deficits 
grow.205 
Another method used in the region in an attempt to achieve food security is to 
purchase or lease land in other, usually less developed, nations and import the food 
grown there.  Essentially, countries that export capital but import food outsource their 
food production to states that need capital but have land, and water, to spare.206  Instead 
of buying food, and the virtual water contained within it, countries obtain land abroad, 
grow food there, and ship it back home.  Several states on the peninsula have taken part 
in these arrangements with Sudan alone providing 400,000 hectares of land for UAE and 
setting aside a total of one-fifth of all arable land in the country for Arab governments.207  
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and others have explored or participated in these deals, not 
just in Africa, but in Australia, South America, Asia, and Eastern Europe as well.  While 
these arrangements are technically about procuring arable land, they also include the 
water that goes along with it, and for the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, the water is 
the most valuable part.208  These land, and water, deals, represent further attempts at 
providing water security for the region, and are another indication of how scarce water is 
on the Arabian Peninsula despite the actions and attitudes of the people and governments 
that reside there. 
C. THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 
Much of this paper to this point has focused on the possibility of conflict between 
states over scarce water resources but, in the Arabian Peninsula at least, “the most 
important water scarcities and conflicts are located within, rather than between, states and 
social formations.”209  Despite the massive importation of virtual water on the world 
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market and the outsourcing of food production to obtain water resources from abroad, the 
nations of the peninsula still are quickly depleting their groundwater and fast outpacing 
their ability to produce water expensively through desalination.  The great inefficiency of 
devoting massive water resources to agricultural and other wasteful purposes is all an 
effort to maintain the illusion that water is still readily available in order to maintain 
political control in the region.  Water has so far had little impact on stability or been a 
cause of unrest, but current water practices are not sustainable.  Without water, the 
stability of the region and the durability of the current governments could be severely 
jeopardized.   
The political situation in much of the Arabian Peninsula is that the countries use 
their plentiful resource—oil, and the money it provides—in order to provide the water 
that is scarce.  Essentially, these governments are turning oil into water.210  Even in those 
nations without significant oil wealth, such as Yemen, in the absence of concerted 
government development, water keeps people tied to their land and provides a way to 
make a living.  Governments have long used water as a political tool.  Many in the region 
have used large tracts of arable land and water to cement political alliances.  For all 
governments, the ability to provide food, water, fuel, electricity, and other essentials 
assures the consent of the governed.  Essentially, government subsidies and inexpensive 
goods and services are exchanged for political support.211  Efforts at importing water 
through the open market or land deals in other countries does bring water in, and 
desalination provides extra resources, but the cost of producing water is growing beyond 
the ability of governments to provide for, and groundwater is rapidly disappearing. 
Countries will increasingly find it more difficult to provide both water and energy at the 
same time.212 
Of course, the states of the Arabian Peninsula may not completely exhaust their 
groundwater or overrun their capacity for desalination, but as assumptions about the 
unlimited and free nature of water begin to change, so too will the assumptions about the 
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governments of these countries.213  These changes do not come from the region’s 
environment, which has always been arid and water scarce, but instead from the 
leadership’s ability to continue its current path of water management.214  The loss of 
groundwater resources, or the inability to provide enough desalinated water, cannot be 
blamed on droughts or outside intervention and instead provide a direct challenge to the 
state’s ability to maintain control.215  Supplying water has been a symbol of the power of 
the state and its strength to provide even in an area of paucity.  The loyalties secured 
through water would no longer be safe.  As water becomes expensive or unavailable, the 
authority of the government will be challenged.  Facing a lack of water would be a new 
experience for those who have never been without, and they may have no choice but to 
protest this new threat to their welfare.216  As efforts to provide cheap and abundant 
water throughout the region fail, societies through the area will be negatively affected and 
the stability of the region will be disturbed.217 
Freshwater scarcity not only threatens the sustainability of the natural resource 
base it also affects all economic sectors, contributes to poverty and urbanization, and 
stresses government institutions.218  As water sources are depleted, those who depended 
on water, either for agriculture or domestic supplies, will be forced to migrate in an 
attempt to find more.  Additionally, tensions between those with claims to certain water 
resources, or of those who expected to receive certain water subsidies from the 
government, will heighten.  These people will feel their government has let them down.  
When groundwater is depleted, there will be little reason to accept the durability of any 
government-proposed solution to the problem.219  Situations similar to these have 
occurred in the past, where the perception existed that the state was not fulfilling its 
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responsibility to provide for its people.  However, while these conditions could be 
addressed in the past by reversing the circumstances that led to the unrest, water would 
present a different case.220  Water shortages could prove to be completely irreversible and 
the unrest unstoppable.  Recent events in the Middle East have shown the potential power 
behind the social unrest that comes from unmet government promises.  Instability would 
be the result of this situation where vast constituencies can no longer be co-opted through 
the inexpensive and inexhaustible supply of water. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Water resources in the Arabian Peninsula are extremely stressed.  Groundwater is 
being depleted at a rapid rate and desalination is expensive and having difficulty keeping 
up with rising demand.  Importing virtual water, either through the market or through 
land deals with other countries, provides an efficient source of water.  Desalination also 
provides additional supplies.  However, because regional practices continue to be wholly 
inefficient and wasteful, the potentially efficient means of obtaining water simply provide 
a way of masking the severe scarcity in the region.  Governments of the region find it 
politically necessary to maintain the illusion that water is both plentiful and inexpensive 
in an attempt to keep their political strength in place and their alliances intact.  However, 
as water supplies dwindle and countries are increasingly unable to meet the high water 
demand there will be severe political repercussions.  Water has long been used as a tool 
of achieving the consent of the governed.  When water becomes increasingly scarce or 
expensive, which is inevitable if current practices continue, people will no longer be 
docile.  Problems such as migration and political alienation will have a negative effect on 
the stability of the region as the glue that holds together the relationship between state 
and population comes undone.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Water, after all, is used to extinguish fires, not to ignite them. 
—Munther J. Haddadin221 
Water is essential.  Aside from the obvious need for drinking, water is critical to 
industry, economies, development, health, religion, and every other conceivable aspect of 
life.  The world’s supply of freshwater is abundant, but many areas face shortages.  These 
scarcities can be the result of either natural or manmade conditions, and in the Middle 
East both of these causes are present.  However, despite the rhetoric and writings of the 
water pessimists, competition between states that share the Jordan, Tigris, and Euphrates 
Rivers have largely not resulted in violent confrontations.  Instead, the countries have 
essentially worked to share the water resources from these rivers, and this cooperation 
has only gotten stronger as time has passed.  Unfortunately, this trend toward cooperation 
and away from unrest does not necessarily hold true when it comes to domestic water 
issues.  The countries on the Arabian Peninsula are currently managing their scarce water 
resources in a way that is unsustainable.  This condition could lead to civil unrest and 
instability in the future. 
Optimists and pessimists both look at the same situations and make opposing 
conclusions.  Pessimists feel that competition for scarce water resources leads to conflicts 
over its control.  This idea means that water scarcity has been at the root of conflicts in 
the past and, as populations and demand for water continues to increase, so too will the 
incidents of international violence.  Pessimists see a trend of escalating conflict 
continuing into the future where water wars will dominate the region.  However, the 
pessimistic outlook is flawed, both in theory and application.  Optimists see water 
scarcity increasingly leading to cooperation.  The pessimistic outlook tends to view 
circumstances very narrowly, looking only at water’s effect on outcomes.  However, 
when viewed through a wider lens, it becomes clear that water has not been a central 
component of past conflicts in the Middle East.  Instead, water has lead to cooperation.  
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Conflict would be a wholly inefficient, expensive, and ineffective means of obtaining 
access to water.  Cooperation, on the other hand, provides benefits to all those who 
choose to participate.  Sharing water is not a zero sum game, and the states of the Middle 
East have much to gain by cooperating over their shared water resources. 
The countries that share the Jordan River and its waters have supposedly fought 
over water several times in the past, and have been singled out as a potential location for 
future water wars.  However, the history simply does not support this idea.  While the 
region certainly has a long history of violent conflict, these clashes have not had water at 
their core.  Instead, regional rivalries and long-standing tensions between the nations 
have been the cause of violence.  Water has provided a means of cooperation between 
these states even when tensions on other matters have been high.  Even in times of 
drought, when pessimists believe water wars are most likely, the region has instead 
looked to conservation and cooperation.  Far from being a cause of wars in the Jordan 
River Valley, water has been a pathway to cooperation. 
The situation is similar for the states that share the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.  
While downstream nations have complained about the actions of those upstream, and 
violence has nearly broken out in the region, water has not caused the violence that so 
many have predicted.  Even without a comprehensive water-sharing agreement between 
those who share these rivers, agreements have been made and upheld that allow for the 
continued use of both rivers.  Despite the rhetoric associated with water use in the region, 
violence has not broken out between these nations.  Efforts at cooperation, however, have 
been widespread and ongoing.  Current conditions in the region only promise more 
cooperation in the future.  Instead of wars over water, the water resources of the Tigris 
and Euphrates have been a source of collaboration and will only lead to more cooperation 
in the future. 
Unlike the role of international waters of the Jordan, Tigris, and Euphrates, the 
domestic water issues facing the states of the Arabian Peninsula have the potential to be 
destabilizing.  Water scarcity is not a new issue to these countries; however, their current 
water management practices cannot be continued.  The region already receives a large 
portion of its water through importing virtual water, and many countries have added to 
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this by obtaining land abroad for the sole purpose of importing the food, and the water 
contained within it.  In additional, desalination provides millions of additional m3 of 
water.  However, even with these supplementary water sources, the region continues to 
use groundwater at an alarming rate.  Once these groundwater sources are depleted, they 
are gone.  Arable land and water have been used as a tool to cement political alliances 
and pacify the populations of these nations, and without the groundwater they depend on, 
migration and political alienation could pose significant problems.  When groundwater 
becomes expensive, or is depleted, the governments could find their authority challenged 
and, as a result, unrest and instability could break out in the region. 
The three regions detailed in the case studies throughout this paper do not need to 
remain in their current situation.  Much can be done to improve all these conditions.  The 
foremost among these is improved knowledge.  Despite all the attention water receives, 
there are still many factors that are unknown or unclear.  River flows are contested 
between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq as well as the countries that share the Jordan.  
Knowledge of groundwater reserves is incomplete in the Jordan Valley as well as the 
Arabian Peninsula.  For international waterways, more detailed knowledge will allow 
stronger agreements and better cooperation between the nations that share the resource.  
For groundwater, accurate accounts of withdrawals and remaining supplies will help 
inform users of the impact they are having, as well as to provide information about just 
how long current practices can be maintained.  Joint monitoring stations, like those set up 
along the Tigris and Euphrates, are a good way to improved knowledge, but they need to 
be more widespread.  All nations involved would benefit from the knowledge these 
stations would provide, and the information obtained would be essential in creating 
further cooperation.  Groundwater reserves need to receive increased attention if their 
true limits are to be understood. 
Large international agreements are generally ineffective in providing management 
for individual river basins.  However, smaller, regional arrangements have proven their 
ability to manage the situations unique to each area.  Currently, no basin-wide 
management schemes exist for either the Jordan or Tigris/Euphrates.  Like any other 
arrangement that places limits on national sovereignty, these deals can be hard to reach.  
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However, the international framework provided by the United Nations’ Convention on 
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses could be the basis 
for these agreements.  Indeed, organizations like the United Nations can make regional 
agreements more likely, not just by providing the overall structure for these more targeted 
arrangements, but also by actively pursing regional arrangements.  To be truly effective, 
regional schemes will need a means of enforcement.  While regional rivals are unlikely to 
agree to a tough enforcement mechanism enforced by one another, they may be more 
likely to agree if a larger international group provided oversight.   
Cooperation over water between nations can easily lead to cooperation in other 
areas.  This principle has been recognized widely in the military realm, where military 
exercises and other forms of working together provide an important tool in national 
diplomacy.  This idea can easily use water concerns as a tool for further consideration.  
Implicit in this is that states today see a much wider view of national security than is 
often recognized, especially with regard to environmental security.  The United States 
already leads cooperative exercises based on environmental security in the CENTCOM 
area of operation.  Exercises such as these can foster cooperation without being nearly as 
threatening as normal military actions.  Normally, these types of cooperation are 
associated with large disaster relief situations but, since international waterways face 
many dangers and have the ability to affect all states that share the waters, these waters 
could provide fertile ground for this type of cooperation and the benefits that come from 
it.  
More efficient use is important to the management of all water resources and can 
eliminate many potential sources of conflict.  However, this is most important in the 
Arabian Peninsula.  Clearly, the renewable water resources in the region are very scarce.  
However, these shortfalls can be completely made up for by importing virtual water.  
Even when the open market does not supply adequate supplies of imports, the land deals 
obtained overseas can still provide adequate water.  Desalination can make up for any 
other shortfalls.  However, instead of relying on these efficient and effective methods of 
obtaining water, the region largely uses these supplemental forms of water to mask their 
scarcity for political reasons.  However, the political uses of water could result in long-
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term political unrest.  Instead, difficult decisions must be made.  The use of groundwater 
must be scaled back.  This can be accomplished through various means, including 
effective monitoring of groundwater use, more effective water pricing, giving up on ideas 
of food self sufficiency masked as food security, more efficient agricultural methods, and 
many others.  However, it is important that the political ramifications from the 
implementation of water saving measures taken over time, and in a careful, thought out 
manner, may cause some problems.  However, these problems are much less severe than 
those that will happen suddenly when groundwater use is no longer possible due to 
depletion. 
No one can tell the future, of course, so we do not know if the trends outlined in 
this paper will continue.  However, by realizing the power water holds, states can go a 
long way toward ensuring water is used effectively.  It can provide a strong impetus 
toward cooperation between countries, even when other relations are not good and even 
in times of elevated need.  It can also become a means of creating instability and unrest 
within a country.  There are many possible solutions to the problems presented by water, 
from the most aggressive military action to the greenest, most ecological actions taken for 
preservation.  The most important quality of water for all nations to understand is that 
water is a finite resource and there are great benefits to be had by all who work to share it 
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